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Abstract 
 
 
This article illustrates and asserts the centrality of stereotypes of the West in the 
development of ‘non-Western’ modernities. Thus it brings together two themes – 
occidentalism and plural modernities - that have been emerged over the last dozen years 
or so to challenge the tautological use of the phrase ‘Western modernity’. These themes 
are developed in the company of two important figures who articulated and deployed the 
idea of the West, the Japanese ‘Westerniser’ Fukuzawa Yukichi and the Indian poet and 
advocate of spiritual Asia, Rabindranath Tagore. Fukuzawa and Tagore developed 
contrasting narratives of both the West and of Asia, narratives which they employed to 
articulate novel and distinctive narratives of the modern. 
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Occidentalism and Plural Modernities: or How Fukuzawa and Tagore Invented the 
West 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 
 
This article illustrates and asserts the centrality of stereotypes of the West in the 
development of ‘non-Western’ modernities. Thus it brings together two themes – 
occidentalism and plural modernities - that have been emerged over the last dozen years 
or so to challenge tautological uses of the phrase ‘Western modernity’.  
 
I shall be drawing on the work of two influential interpreters of the West - the Japanese 
‘Westerniser’ and nationalist Fukuzawa Yukichi (1834-1901) and the Indian poet and 
advocate of spiritual Asia, Rabindranath Tagore (1861-1941)  - to show how contrasting 
stereotypes of the West (and Asia) have been employed to articulate novel and distinctive 
narratives of modernity. The West that I will be portraying is a project fashioned outside 
the West. Far from being presented as the world’s primordial modern identity, it is found 
to be an idea produced elsewhere; an idea whose meaning and use reflects both 
geographically particular intellectual lineages as well as the wider global context of 
European imperial authority.  
 
Some British readers may remember John Roberts’s The Triumph of the West. It was a 
magisterial BBC television series and book which traced the familiar story of the West’s 
continuous and ever more complete domination. The last line of Robert’s book sums up 
both the direction of Roberts’ argument and one of the central clichés of our era: ‘the 
story of western civilisation is now the story of mankind’ (1985, p431; see also 
Fukuyama, 1992; Mandelbaum, 2002). This article contributes to a transposition of 
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Roberts’s terms. I will be showing that it is more accurate to say that ‘western civilisation 
is now one of the stories of ‘mankind’’. This approach should not be construed as a 
demotion of the idea of the West. In fact, it represents an assertion of its importance. That 
the idea of ‘the West’ was central to the different versions of modernity offered by 
Fukuzawa and Tagore is indicative of the mutually constituting nature of occidentalisms 
and modernities the world over. 
 
After introducing contemporary debate on occidentalism and plural modernities, this 
essay falls into two main parts. Two contrasting accounts of the relationship between 
occidentalism and ‘non-Western’ modernity are presented. In the first section I address 
the way images of the West (and Asia) were employed by Fukuzawa in order to sustain a 
vision of Japanese modernity. More specifically, it is shown that Fukuzawa saw the West 
as both forcing and enabling a rationalist and meritocratic revolution in Japanese society, 
processes that reflected and  necessitated a striving for national independence and 
nationalist consciousness. Fukuzawa’s nationalist modernity contrasts sharply with the 
anti-nationalist, spiritual modernity depicted in the next part of the essay. Here I explore 
how Tagore employed and deployed stereotypes of the West in order to fabricate and 
promote an ‘Asian consciousness’ and an Asian pathway through the modern. I also take 
the opportunity to directly challenge the ubiquitous assumption that the idea of Asian 
spirituality is, simply or largely, a product of Western orientalism. That the modernity of 
Tagore is not a borrowed device is reaffirmed in a final sub-section, where the reflexive 
aspects of both his own attitude and his social milieu are identified.  
 
The West emerged as a central concept in Western Europe towards the end of the 
nineteenth century (Bonnett, 2003; GoGwilt, 1995). However, in other parts of the world 
it was already a familiar idea. Indeed, the idea of the West had been debated in Russia, in 
East Asia and in the Middle East, for at least a century before it entered into the West’s 
own lexicon of key geo-political categories (Bonnett, 2002a; 2002b; 2004; Neuman 1996; 
1999). Thus Al-e Ahmad, summarising the long tradition of Islamic and Iranian interest 
in the West, expresses a wider history when he notes that ‘It appears from history that we 
have always been watching the West’. Al-e Ahmad adds, ‘[w]e used the term ‘western’ 
 4 
before foreigners called us ‘eastern’ (1982, p11). As this implies, to appreciate how and 
why the East invented the West it is not necessary to construct some ironic, 
deconstructive device through which Eastern agency can be read between the lines of 
Western texts. Rather than focusing on how the ‘marginalised’ and ‘silenced’ interrupt 
the discourse of the dominant West, it can be illuminating to do something a little more 
obvious, such as read non-Western accounts of the West. In fact, the former approach 
perpetuates a misleading vision of Western centrality. Western occidentalism and 
orientalism neither exhaust nor define the modern geographical imagination. This 
argument lead us to another, closely related, position. For when addressing Fukuzawa's 
and Tagore's occidentalism we must also confront the ubiquitous assumption that the idea 
of Asia can be described as a Western invention. ‘Simply put’, says Ravi Palat (2002, 
p687), ‘Asia’s unity derives from, and derives only from, its historical and contemporary 
role as Europe’s civilizational other’. As the Finnish linguist Pekka Korhonen notes in his 
account of the complex roots of the term ‘Asia’, the ‘modern reader, whose thinking has 
been influenced by Edward Said’s concept of Orientalism’ (2002, p254), tends to seize 
upon proof of Western hegenomy wherever she or he looks. A more balanced analysis 
suggests that to claim that the idea of ‘Asia’ is a mere parasitic off-shoot of the West is 
both misleading and Eurocentric. Indeed, as Tagore’s work illustrates, ‘Asianist’ 
discourse  shows a persistent tendency, especially in the first fifty years of the twentieth 
century, to define itself not as a fixed, inverted image of the West but as a mobile site of 
solidarity and as a transcendence of the West. Fukuzawa, who wished Japan to say ‘good-
bye’ to Asia and join the West, had a very different agenda. However, his ‘Asia’, along 
with his ‘West’ were, like Tagore’s, products of a specific, regional spatial narrative that 
cannot be reduced to an account of Western power. 
 
 
Occidentalism and Plural Modernities 
 
Judging by the sudden eruption of new work on the topic, occidentalism is an idea whose 
time has come. For Western scholars it would be convenient to imagine that what we are 
witnessing is an evolution of something familiar, namely Said’s theory of orientalism. It 
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could then be supposed that a focus on the West’s construction of the East is now being 
supplemented, or merely footnoted, by an interest in constructions of the West. Yet, on 
closer inspection, occidentalism is too politically, historically and geographically 
heterogeneous and important to be rendered in this manner. More specifically, the 
assumption that the critique of Western orientalism produced, led or pre-dates the critique 
of occidentalism in each and every part of the world is erroneous. This is not to argue that 
such a lineage does not exist but that it is geographically specific. It is, unsurprisingly,  
most clearly seen in those places where Said’s work had the greatest impact and about 
which he had the most to say, namely the West and the Middle East. In the West, Said’s 
concern to generate critique of the West’s dominant geographical vision has been 
consciously extended to arrive at a critique of occidentalism defined as a Western project 
of self-invention (GoGwilt, 1995; Venn, 2000; Nadel-Klein, 1995). Thus, for Coronil 
(1996, p57), ‘Occidentalism [must] be unsettled as a style of representation that produces 
polarised and hierarchical conceptions of the West and its Others.’ Christopher Gogwilt’s 
(1995) ‘genealogy of the West’  provides the historical detail demanded of such a project. 
Calling attention to the ‘invention of the West’ in the mirror of the Bolshevik revolution 
and post-colonial aspiration, he notes that,  ‘[t]he rhetorical force of the term “the West”’,   
 
draws not only from the reconstruction of European history refashioned in the 
inverted image of Russian history, but also from the construction of a European 
history articulated in response to and within the specific contexts of a whole range 
of non-European cultural histories. (p236) 
 
Said’s Orientalism (1978) has also instigated a debate on occidentalism in Arabic. The 
most substantial work to date has been the Egyptian philosopher Hassan Hanafi’s  
Muquaddima fi ‘ilm al-istighrab [Introduction to the Science of Occidentalism] (1991). 
Hanafi views occidentalism as a new science of liberation. He explains that 
‘Occidentalism is a discipline constituted in Third World countries in order to complete 
the process of decolonization’ (1995, p354). Hanafi’s aim is to study and, hence, 
objectify the West in order to enable a clearer sense of an independent Islamic (more 
specifically, Arab Muslim) sense of ‘self’. However, Said’s role as paterfamilias for Arab 
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occidentalism is easily exaggerated. The critique of the West, more specifically those 
critiques of the occident that aim to affirm an Arab and Muslim identity have a complex 
heritage in the Middle East (including Islamist and left-Islamic currents; for example, 
Qutb, 1990; Shariati, 1980). This heritage has not been lost on many readers of Hanafi. 
Drawing these critical voices together Yudian Wahyudi accuses Hanafi of accepting 
Orientalist dualism, of Arab ethnocentrism and of ignoring the basic fact that,  
 
making Western thought an object of study, as does the Muquaddima, does not 
amount to establishing a new science, since university and public libraries are full 
of studies of Western schools of thought. In this regard, [Hanafi’s] 
‘Occidentalism’ … constitutes more of a type of ideologically-based preaching 
than a ‘science’. (Wahyudi, 2003, p242) 
 
Wahyudi’s remarks remind us of the diverse heritage of occidentalism. They are also 
suggestive of the possibility of less reductive approaches than Hanafi’s. Indeed, new 
work on the idea of the West from scholars across Afro-Asia, evidences little interest in 
constructing negative images of the West. Rather it insists on the importance of studying 
non-Western representations of the West in their own right, as both intrinsically 
important and as possessing a degree of autonomy from Western global hegemony. 
English language examples that reflect this perspective include studies of the 
development of stereotypes of the West  in China (Song, 2000, Chen, 1995; Ning, 1997), 
Sri Lanka (Spencer, 1995), Egypt (Al-Ali, 2000), Japan (Hutchins, 2001; Creighton, 
1995), and Iran, (Tavakoli-Targhi, 1990; 2001). All these contributions build on a large, 
yet scattered and specialised literature of how the West has been viewed around the world 
(for example, Aizawa, 1986; Hirth, 1966; Teng and Fairbank, 1979; Chang, 1970; 
Siddiqi, 1956; Hay, 1970). Yet although individual contributions from this earlier body of 
work, such as Stephen Hay’s (1970) study of Tagore’s visions of East and West, remain 
unsurpassed, the critical focus of the emerging trajectory within occidental studies is 
distinctive. More specifically, what is exciting about this work is its concern with the 
political and social uses and deployment of occidentalism in the context of non-Western 
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forms of modernity, as well as its emphasis on the mutually constitutive nature of 
Western and non-Western identities. 
 
The Chinese sociologist, Sun Ge, has made a particularly explicit attempt to refocus 
debates on orientalism onto the Asian use of ideas of East and West. ‘In the hands of the 
Asians’ she notes, Orientalism ‘it is not positioned against the Western world from the 
perspective of the East, but rather against an image of the West constructed in Asia’ (Sun, 
2000b, p14). What is being described by Sun is not al-’Azm’s (1981, p19) ‘orientalism in 
reverse’, in which Easterners succumb to ‘the dangers and temptations of applying the 
readily available [i.e., Western] structures, styles and ontological biases of Orientalism 
upon themselves and upon others’. Sun’s analysis does not posit, empirically or 
theoretically, either orientalism or occidentalism as inherently Western devices. Whilst 
al-’Azm assumes a primacy and determining power for Western conceptions of itself and 
its others, Sun’s point – which is endorsed in the following case-studies – is that ‘the 
West’ can be seen as having multiple sites of creation: there is no ur-text of 
occidentalism.  
 
These debates exceed the concerns and canon of the greater part of post-colonial studies. 
An interest in occidentalism and the Western reification of modernity in its own image 
does, however, find overlaps with the lively post-colonial debate on non-Western uses of 
nationalism. Thus, for example, an interest in the paradoxes of using something ‘foreign’ 
to assert something ‘indigenous’ animates Chatterjee’s (1986) and Tang’s (1996) 
examination of non-Western nationalism. Tang’s work on nationalism in China identifies 
how it both enforced ‘subordination’ to a European linear and Eurocentric view of 
modernity,  whilst enabling a new Chinese national and global imagination to form, thus 
‘reassert[ing] space in cognitive principle’ (p232). Thus Tang concurs with Chatterjee’s 
point that, 
 
Nationalist thought, in agreeing to become ‘modern’, accepts the claim to 
universality of this ‘modern’ framework of knowledge. Yet it also asserts the 
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autonomous identity of national culture. It thus simultaneously rejects and accepts 
the dominance, both epistemic and moral, of an alien culture. (1986, p11) 
 
Chatterjee’s and Tang’s  concern with ambivalence in respect to the West, a concern with 
being ‘inside and outside’ Western modernity, is of immense value. However, if one 
starts one’s investigations with an interest in the way the idea of the West has been 
employed and deployed around the world, a wider panorama of ‘non-Western’ agency 
also comes into view. As the mimetic problematic recedes, the status of Fukuzawa and 
Tagore as peripheral to Western modernity comes to seem less important than their 
ability to put the idea of the West to work to help shape the social and political projects to 
which they were committed.  
 
This brings me to those emergent scholarly traditions that are seeking to pluralise 
modernity. There remain, at least, four pathways within this body of work. First, and of 
least relevance to our enquires here, is the attempt by Lash and others to deconstruct 
Western modernity and show its inner tensions and diversity (1999; see also 
Featherstone, Lash and Robertson, 1995). The other three approaches – namely 
alternative modernities, co-eval modernities and multiple modernities - each seek to 
break the equation between the West and modernity. They share a desire to move away 
from a myopic focus on  ‘how the West made the modern world’ and interrogate other 
sites of modernity. Something can be learned from each of these approaches. However, 
although echoes of each will be found later in this paper, it is within the notion of ‘co-
eval modernities’ that I have found the most productive points of emphasis.  
 
‘Alternative modernities’ is the approach best known within post-colonial studies. The 
term ‘alternative’ chimes with the emphasis that post-colonial studies has come to place 
on the transgressive and subversive nature of the non-Western encounter with the West. 
Thus the Afro-modernity portrayed by Hanchard (1999) and Gilroy (1993) is a counter-
cultural phenomenon, a product of African agency operating through but in opposition to 
a hegemonic Western modernity. An emphasis on oppositionality has come to mark both 
the distinctiveness and the limits of the alternative modernity perspective. The iron cage 
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of ‘oppostionalism’ locks these authors into a permanently subordinate relationship with 
Western modernity. Their political stance acerbates the contrast with protagonists of 
‘multiple modernities’.  Indeed, it may be indicative that contributors to the alternative 
modernities and multiple modernities approaches tend not to engage or acknowledge the 
existence of the work of each other. There was, for example, no cross-referencing of 
either scholars or scholarship between Public Culture’s (1999) special issue on 
‘alter/native modernities’ and Daedalus’s (2000) special issue on multiple modernities. 
Indeed, the post-modern radicalism of the former journal and the academic traditionalism 
of the latter may be taken to reflect the different institutional basis of the two approaches.  
 
Through a series of wide-ranging comparative historical studies, Shmuel Eisenstadt has 
helped establish the concept of ‘multiple modernities’ in contemporary historical 
sociology (Eisenstadt, 1999; 2000; Sachsenmaier, Eisenstadt and Riedel, 2002). One of 
the most useful aspects of Eisenstadt’s contribution has been his attention to the way the 
cultural re-inscription of modernity around the world illuminates aspects of and tensions 
within modernity that have been neglected in Western focused studies. Thus, for 
example, Eisenstadt addresses the way, in all modern societies, ‘collective identities’ 
become denaturalised and are ‘foci of contestation and struggle’ (2000, p7). An interest 
in this process allows us to see how that the inventive power of Fukuzawa and Tagore, 
both with regard to ideas of ‘the West’ and ‘Asia’, is testament to their modern 
sensibility. Other characteristically modern  themes that Eisenstadt emphasises are the 
conflict between ‘human autonomy and the restrictive controls inherent in the 
institutional realization of modern life’ (p8) and the politicization of previously 
undisturbed class, ethnic and other ‘center-periphery relations (p6).  
 
However, the multiple modernities school must also be seen as part of a longer tradition 
of comparative studies of civilisation, a tradition presided over by Arnold Toynbee. This 
pedigree is strengthened by Eisenstadt’s identification of Western civilisation as the 
origin of modernity and with different civilisations as having different religious cores 
(cores which provoke different pathways through modernity). These preoccupations have 
interesting echoes with a variety of popular renditions of the desire to break the link 
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between modernity and Westernisation. The idea that ‘civilization’ is a useful category of 
analysis and that civilizations have religious cores, combined with a critique of the 
West’s claims on modernity, are all central to Samuel Huntingdon‘s The Clash of 
Civilisations (1997).  A possible correlation between the rise to public prominence of this 
kind of thinking and the emergence of a ‘post-9/11’ geo-political sensibility, is suggested 
by even more recent interventions, such as Scruton’s (2002) The West and the Rest, and 
Gray’s (2003) Al Qaeda and What it Means to be Modern.  For both the conservative 
(Scruton) and the liberal intellectual (Gray), it is time the West moved beyond its 
traditional, jealous, claim on the ownership of modernity.  
 
In the context of the mutual indifference of those writing about ‘alternative’ and 
‘multiple’ modernities, it is particularly valuable that the Japanese studies specialist 
Harry Harootunian appears cognizant of both traditions and, more importantly, has 
arrived, largely independently, at a third approach,  which he calls ‘co-eval’ (i.e., co-
evolving and co-existing) modernities. Harootunian is particularly critical of the 
alternative modernities thesis. He casts it as an attempt to demote non-Western modernity 
to the status of mere resistance. In Overcome by Modernity, a book which unpacks 
Japanese intellectuals’ engagements with modernity in the 1920 and 1930s, Harootunian 
(2000) attacks  
 
new, often outrageous classifications like ‘alternative modernities’ or retroactive 
modernities differentiated from the temporality of the modern West which … 
allows us to safely situate societies like Japan in a historical trajectory derived 
from another’s development. (pxvi) 
 
Harootunian’s co-eval modernity refuses the lexicon of resistance as inadequate to the 
task of properly critiquing and understanding the different forms of non-Western 
modernity. In part, this critique reflects a difference in intellectual starting point. 
‘Alternative modernities’ inevitably starts from what it must posit as the mainstream or 
normal modernity of the West. By contrast, ‘co-eval modernities’ starts from an interest 
and knowledge of  those societies whose production of modernity is to be traced. At the 
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same time and as the term suggests, ‘co-evalists’ insist in setting any particular modern 
form within a global and relational setting. As Horootunian notes, ‘ Japan’s modernity … 
[was] an inflection of a larger global process that constituted what might be called co-
existing or co-eval modernity’ (pxvi). 
 
The idea of co-eval modenrities also disrupts the emphasis on cultural essence and 
religious roots that propels the advocates of multiple modernity to be so concerned with 
locating civilizational units. Harootunian summarises co-evolving modernity as follows 
 
What co-eval suggests is contemporaneity yet the possibility of difference. 
Thinkers and writers responded to Japan's modernity by describing its as a 
doubling that imprinted a difference between the new demands of capitalism and 
the market and the force of received forms of history and cultural patterns (pxvii) 
 
Horootunian’s depictions are sustained by the exploration of the modern thought of 
Fukuzawa and Tagore. In each case, we find distinct pathways towards a form of 
modernity that can only be understood as having been produced from regional traditions 
developing within a global scene where the West is both a major (but not all-powerful) 
force, and an evolving idea that is employed and deployed to structure different 
aspirations towards the modern.  
  
 
 
The Uses of the West 
 
Throughout the world there are certain clichés about the West that have come to play an 
important role in the formation of national and pan-national ‘non-Western’ identities. The 
supposed individualism and materialism of the West, along with its secular and 
instrumental culture, are some of the better known characteristics identified in almost 
every corner of the globe. Using the capitalised term ‘Civilization’ as a synonym for the 
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West, and lower case ‘civilisation’ to denote other, non-hegemonic, traditions, Prasenjit 
Duara makes the following observation of the ‘basic’ use of the West in Asia: 
 
The basic approach involved combining elements that are a) identical to and b) 
the binary opposite of the constituents of Civilisation. One strategy is to 
rediscover elements identical to Civilised society within the suppressed traditions 
of civilisation: Confucian rationality, Buddhist humanism, Hindu logic, and so on. 
Another strategy identifies the opposite of the West in Asian civilisation: 
‘peaceful’ as opposed to ‘warlike’, ‘spiritual’ as opposed to ‘material’, ‘ethical’ as 
opposed to ‘decadent’, ‘natural’ as opposed to ‘rational’, ‘timeless’ as opposed to 
‘temporal’, and more. Finally, the nation authorizes its opposition to imperialist 
Civilisation by synthesizing or harmonizing the binaries after the equivalence has 
been established. Thus Western materialism will be balanced by Eastern 
spirituality and modernity redeemed. (Duara, 2001, p108) 
 
Duara is arguing for an appreciation of the dialectics of modern regional identities. This 
model usefully highlights the interaction of conflicting visions of the West. However, 
dialectics has its own momentum, one that tends to obscure the jagged and unresolvable 
nature of different representations of the West. More specifically, Duara’s approach 
neglects the utility of different representations of the West for different social groups. 
What may be functional to the sustainability of the national unit is not necessarily an 
appropriate focus in the context of social and political struggle over the idea of the West, 
struggle that is unlikely to produce a clear synthesis.  
 
A similar point may be made about attempts to frame non-Western uses of the West 
within the terminology of hybridity. Like dialectics, hybridity is a model with its own 
logical momentum. It suggests the mating of two distinct stocks to create a partially 
original third form. The racial and breeding connotations of hybridity are critiqued 
historically by Young (1995). Bhabha (1994), who is often associated with the term’s 
contemporary currency, tries to distance himself from such interpretations by insisting  
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that  colonial authority is not a problem of genealogy or identity between two 
different cultures which can then be resolved as an issue of cultural relativism. 
Hybridity is a problematic of colonial representation and individuation that 
reverses the effects of the colonialist disavowal, so that other ‘denied’ knowledges 
enter upon the dominant discourse and estrange the basis of its authority – its 
rules of recognition. (p114)  
 
However, this deconstructive emphasis does not resolve the problem of either the 
political or the logical momentum of hybridity theory, which privileges the original, 
defining power of the West. I will not be labelling either Fukuzawa and Tagore as hybrid 
thinkers. Such a categorisation would mislead by insinuating that, relative to Western 
intellectuals, these men were imitative and secondary. It would also encourage an 
unhelpful a priori politicisation of their work, implying that what is most interesting 
about Fukuzawa and Tagore is their role as cultural emancipators and transgressors. In 
this way, the social and political particularities that need to be understood in order to 
make sense of Fukuzawa and Tagore would be displaced by a flattening and 
homogenising emphasis on the achievement of hybridrity.  
 
 
 
Fukuzawa Yukichi: Occidentalism and Nationalist Modernity 
 
Fukuzawa Yukichi is the most well-known and influential of the nineteenth century 
Japanese Westernisers. Born in 1834, as a child Fukuzawa studied rangaku (‘Dutch 
learning’) at school in Nagasaki, at a time when the Dutch were the only Westerners 
allowed even limited entry into the country. In 1862 he was part of the Takenouchi 
mission to the West, the first of a series of official Japanese investigations of Western 
society, industry and economic development. His glowing account of what he saw was 
published in 1866 (‘Conditions in the West’, 1958) and became an immediate best-seller. 
Fukuzawa later wrote the primary school textbook, World Geography (1959; first 
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published 1869), which drew on similar material and explicitly placed Europe at the 
centre of world civilisation.  
 
One indication of Fukuzawa’s influence is that between 1866-1878 all nine of the best-
selling books in Japan were either Western translations or about the West, and that the 
latter were popularly referred to as ‘Fukuzawa books’. Fukuzawa is also credited with 
writing ‘a crucial text that marks the beginning of modern thinking in Japan’ (Sakamoto, 
1996, p116). This work is An Outline of a Theory of Civilisation. It was published in 
1875  (Fukuzawa, 1973; see also Fukuzawa, 1934; 1969; 1985; 1988) and is Fukuzawa’s 
most substantial intervention on the nature and meaning of the West.  
 
In An Outline of a Theory of Civilisation Fukuzawa identifies ‘the West’ (a term he tends 
to equate with Western Europe) with civilisation and suggests that Japan must re-invent 
itself  as Western for the sake of its own future. His message was uncompromising: 
merely copying the exterior or superficial aspects of Western civilisation was not enough. 
 
[W]e must not import only the outward forms of civilisation, but must first make 
the spirit of civilisation ours and only then adopt its external forms … The 
cornerstone of modern civilisation will be laid only when national sentiment has 
thus been revolutionised, and government institutions with it. When that is done, 
the foundations of civilization will be laid, and the outward forms of material 
civilization will follow in accord with a natural process without special effort on 
our part, will come without our asking, will be acquired without our seeking. This 
is why I say that we should give priority to the more difficult side of assimilating 
European civilization. We should reform men’s minds, then turn to government 
decrees, and only in the end go out to external things. (Fukuzawa, 1973, p17-8) 
 
As this passage suggests, the survival of Japanese traditional culture was of little 
significance to Fukuzawa. This is not because he regarded ‘Japaneseness’ as unimportant 
but, rather, because, in the context of  expanding and predatory Western global 
ambitions, he identified ‘backward looking’ cultures as doomed. Thus, in contrast to the 
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far more fragile and novel sense of national identity being developed by Westernizers in 
other ‘non-Western’ societies (for example, by Gökalp in Turkey; see Gökalp, 1981), 
Fukuzawa did not bracket off the country’s ‘inner spirit’ as an untouchable and defining 
essence. The only essence he was concerned to protect was that of national independence, 
something that Japan had kept ‘intact from earliest antiquity’ (Fukuzawa, 1973, p27), but 
which was now under threat from Western imperialism and required a drastic social 
revolution to retain.  
 
Now, the only duty of the Japanese at present is to preserve Japan’s national 
polity. For it preserve national polity will be to preserve national sovereignty. And 
in order to preserve national sovereignty the intellectual powers of the people 
must be elevated … the first order of business in development of our intellectual 
powers lies in sweeping away blind attachment to past customs and adopting the 
spirit of Western civilization. (p28) 
 
Fukuzawa argued that this process required a shift away from blind loyalty to the 
imperial line and a greater focus on Japan as an active national community. Within this 
national community the allocation of rewards and responsibilities should be a matter, not 
of custom or inheritance, but individual merit. The characteristic of the West that most 
excited Fukuzawa’s enthusiasm was its open, transparent and rational system of social 
advance. It is an enthusiasm that draws us into consideration of the way Fukuzawa’s idea 
of the West reflected the aspirations of a rising middle class in Japan. 
 
Fukuzawa shared with many other, contemporaneous, Westernisers around the world, a 
social background of educated middle class exasperation. In his autobiography (1934), he 
identifies his position ‘in a family of low rank’ (it was low samurai) as creating the 
conditions for his ‘discontent’ (p189) and ‘naïve dislike of oppression’ (p199).  Indeed, 
Fukuzawa’s constant theme in An Outline of a Theory of Civilisation is merit and 
intelligence; more specifically, the need for Japan to be run on the basis of education 
rather than lineage. ‘Tradition’ is identified with the fetters of feudalism and the West 
represented as meritocratic in social structure and critical in disposition. ‘If we seek the 
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essence of Western civilisation’, he notes, ‘it lies in the fact that they scrutinise whatever 
they experience with the five sense, in order to discover its essence and its functions’ 
(p111). Fukuzawa paints a portrait of intellectual and academic enquiry occurring ‘right 
down to the remotest village’ in the West. ‘This process is repeated many times’ he adds, 
‘in the end, a national opinion takes shape’ (p79). Thus, for Fukuzawa, the West does  not 
contain cleverer people but values clever people more. In Japan ‘the people who felt [the 
need for meritocracy] 
 
were leading inconspicuous lives as doctors or writers, or were to be found among 
the samurai in this han or that, or among Buddhist monks and Shinto priests. All 
of them were learned men who could not realize their ambitions in society. (p65) 
 
Thus the West is used as a tool and as a model to promote the re-distribution of power 
between the traditional elite and an aspirational class. This class agenda also animated 
another ambition in Fukuzawa, to introduce the concept of personal competition and the 
ideology of capitalist entrepeneuralism into Japanese society. Indeed, the common 
identification of Fukuzawa as the intellectual founding father of Japanese 
entrepenurialism and capitalism (Tamaki, 2001), reflects the continuing salience of an 
image of ‘the West’ as a force and a social template able to release the pent-up energies 
of the dynamic, middle classes. 
  
Such sentiments were to be channelled and reflected by the Westernising policies of the 
Meiji imperial regime (1868-1912). As this relationship suggests, Fukuzawa was not 
embarked on a project of democratisation. During the nineteenth century, democracy was 
not closely associated with Westernisation, either in Japan or Europe. ‘Progress’ and 
‘civilisation’ implied a more rational society but not necessarily a less authoritarian forms 
of politics. Indeed, it was clear to Fukuzawa that the West was successful, in part, 
because it was prepared to dominate non-civilised peoples, a habit that Fukuzawa 
encouraged the Japanese to emulate.  
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Good-bye Asia 
 
Fukuzawa did not develop his ideas simply in terms of an opposition between Japan and 
the West. He constantly referred to China and Asia in order to articulate his position. 
Although his usage was not consistent, Fukuzawa tended to cast both China and Asia as 
the opposites of the West whilst placing Japan as more capable of assimilating Western 
civilisation. In terms of the structure of Fukuzawa’s argument, China has as important a 
role in An Outline of a Theory of Civilisation as the West. It is China that is represented 
as static and passive; China that is cast as hopelessly archaic and vulnerable to national 
humiliation. Where these attributes are located in Japan they are cast as stemming from 
the age-old domination of Japanese culture by China. 
 
The following passage exemplifies this ‘othering’ of China, as well as hinting at the 
aggressive and nationalistic foreign policies that Fukuzawa’s work was later taken to 
condone. 
 
Such phrases as ‘be gentle, modest, and deferring to others’, or ‘rule by inaction’, 
or ‘the holy man does not have ambition’ … all refer to inner states which in the 
West would be described as merely ‘passive’. … The Chinese Classics, of course 
do not teach only this kind of passive virtue. Some passages imply a more 
dynamic frame of mind. However, the spirit which breathes throughout those 
works stirs up in people an attitude of patient endurance and servility. (Fukuzawa, 
1973, p79) 
 
For Sakamoto (2001, p149)  Fukuzawa may be identified as holding ‘Western racialist-
Orientalist images’ of China. However, the notion that Fukuzawa’s vision of Asia was a 
mere repetition of a master discourse of East and West disseminated form the West is 
inadequate. ‘Asia’,  ‘the East’ and ‘the West’ were ideas already in circulation in Japan 
before their elaboration in the West. Iida (1997, p412) notes that, as early as 1715, Arai 
Hakuseki had offered a ‘proto-type of the notion of Asia’  when he contrasted the East as 
‘spiritual civilisation’ to the ‘material civilisation’ of the West. Moreover, in Japan’s 
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Orient, Stefan Tanaka (1993), details that the long history of orientalist and occidentalist 
commentary. Tanaka also argues that the ‘shift’ from China to the West as the dominant 
influence on Japanese culture,  
 
did not entail the simple replacement of China by the West … The difference 
between the use of China and the use of the West was that the previous world was 
one in which all life was construed as being part of a fixed realm … The West 
brought a different perspective, the probable future; knowledge was infinite. (p32-
33) 
 
The most well-known slogan associated with Fukuzawa concerns the relation between 
Japan, the West and Asia. The title of his essay Datsu-a nyu-o (1997), first published in 
1885, has been translated as ‘On leaving Asia’, ‘Disassociating Asia’ and, more simply, 
‘Good-bye Asia’. It suggests that Japan must now consider itself part of Western 
civilisation and thus ‘dissociate’ itself from its barbaric and doomed neighbours:  
 
We do not have time to wait for the enlightenment of our neighbors so that we can 
work together toward the development of Asia. It is better for us to leave the 
ranks of Asian nations and cast our lot with civilized nations of the West. As for 
the way of dealing with China and Korea, no special treatment is necessary just 
because they happen to be our neighbors. We simply follow the manner of the 
Westerners in knowing how to treat them. Any person who cherishes a bad friend 
cannot escape his notoriety. We simply erase from our minds our bad friends in 
Asia.  (Fukuzawa, 1997, p353). 
 
This stance did not suggest that Japan should cut itself off from Asia but, rather, that 
Japan was a nation of a different order, a higher type. Saying good-bye to Asia meant, 
ironically, being more involved with it; not as an equal but in a similar fashion to other 
Western powers. This position was also developed by Fukuzawa to suggest that Japan 
was the natural leader and defender of weak and anarchic Asian nations against Western 
military might. As Sakamoto (1996) has shown, this attitude to Asia, whilst more explicit 
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and clearly colonialist towards the end of Fukuzawa’s life, was present throughout his 
work. He goes on to argue that Fukuzawa’s work ‘annuls the West/Japan dichotomy’, 
leaving the ‘civilisation/non-civilization dichotomy’ intact, and ‘’Asia’ [to function] as 
the negative Other of civilised Westernised/hybridised Japan’ (p125). Sakamoto’s real 
target here is the political naiveté of contemporary theories of hybridisation. He 
concludes that  
 
the construction of a hybrid discourse, at least in Japan’s case, led to the exclusion 
of another Other, which Bhabha’s theory ignores. To “go beyond” one dichotomy 
without creating yet another may not be an easy project. (p126).  
 
Clearly, Fukuzawa’s work does not sustain a vision of hybridity as a kind of ‘open’ and 
reflexive third moment. Indeed, to extend Sakamoto’s argument,  I would cast doubt on 
the utility of conceptualising his work as an example of hybridity at all. Rather than 
importing or translating a ready-made idea of the West, Fukuzawa actively fashioned a 
certain representation of the West to suit his own (and, in large measure, his social 
class’s) particular political ambitions. This process is best understood as a creative and 
original intervention in the history of the idea of the West. In this way we can position 
Fukuzawa alongside Kidd, Spengler and Toynbee in the West, as well as other 
intellectuals in the ‘non-Western’ world (such as Gökalp and Tagore): all people engaged 
with the similar challenge of working out the meaning of modern national and 
international identities in an unequal world.  
 
 
Modernity and National Independence 
 
It is through Fukuzawa’s desire to invent and shape identity that his modernity emerges 
most clearly. This attitude, one of the few he shares with Tagore, ensures that collective 
identities become ‘foci of contestation and struggle’ (Eisenstadt, 2000, p7). The central 
identities for Fukuzawa are the West, Asia and, above all, the Japanese nation. For 
Fukuzawa modernity is a discourse of national independence. It is a form of resistance to 
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Western hegemony that co-opts Western civilisation in order to preserve national 
autonomy. Despite Fukuzawa’s reputation as a reformer, his primary motivation is to 
conserve the nation. ‘Japan’s uniqueness’, Fukuzawa notes ‘lies only in the fact that she 
has preserved national polity intact from earliest antiquity and has never been deprived of 
her sovereignty by a foreign power’ (p27). At the end of An Outline of a Theory of 
Civilisation he reminds readers that his ‘ultimate goal’ is ‘national independence and all 
aspects of life [should be] made to converge on this single goal … Whether institutions, 
learning, business, or industry, they are all means to this end’ (p196). The ideas of ‘the 
West’ and of ‘Asia’ are employed and deployed by Fukuzawa in order to fashion not just 
a new Japan but a Japan that is capable of surviving in an increasingly aggressive and 
predatory world. Fukuzawa’s West is a place of meritocracy and rational learning, a place 
where the middle class thrives and where a sense of national community and solidarity 
ensures an active, participatory population. Yet despite Fukuzawa’s desire for a  profound 
cultural shift towards the West, he also continued to conceptualise the West as a set of 
traits that could be bolted on to an existing primordial national unit: ‘Western civilization 
is the best possible means of making our country strong and our Imperial line flourish, so 
why should we hesitate to adopt it’ (cited by Blacker, 1968, p33). Fukuzawa’s made fun 
of unthinking Westernisers who had forgotten the national raison d’être  of the 
modernising impulse. Such folk, says Fukuzawa, believed ‘in the new with the same 
belief that they had believed in the old’ (cited by Blacker, 1968 p39). Unthinking 
Westernisers thus deployed the same uncritical and pre-rational orientation as those who 
wished to retain the ‘old abuses’ of traditional Japan. However, as we shall now see, 
modernity and the West could be employed in ways that were far less sympathetic to 
nationalist aspirations. 
 
  
 
Rabindranath Tagore: ‘True Modernism’ and the Soulless West  
 
The Asian invention of Asia as a space of spirituality saw an effort to live and transcend 
cultural difference on an extraordinary scale. Although this effort can be identified in 
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many parts of the continent, one of the strongest traditions may be located in Bengal. 
Rammohan Roy (1772-1833), Swami Vivekananada (1862-1902), Debendranath Tagore 
(1817-1905) and his disciple, Keshubchandra Sen, all identified Asia as the spiritual 
home of humankind. However, if one name stands pre-eminent in this lineage it is 
Debendranath Tagore’s son, the poet and essayist Rabindranath Tagore (1861-1941). 
Tagore had a message to Asia and a mission to the world. It was a message that makes 
contentious claims about the meaning of Asia. Yet it also offered Asian spirituality as a 
project in the making, something that needed to be willed into existence. Tagore’s 
message about Asia is inseparable from his message about the West. The one defined the 
other. Tagore saw in the West the unacceptable version of modernity. Western modernity 
was a misguided form of modernity, Tagore argued, for it represented the despoliation of 
personality and individuality by an increasingly standardised and industrialised social 
system. Tagore wished to resist the West through a process of education and 
transcendence. What cohered this enterprise was a desire to imagine Asia as possessing 
both a soul and a mind that was distinctively non-Western. Tagore’s endeavour offered a 
vision of the West as a single civilisation defined by its technical achievements but also, 
and more profoundly, by its lack of a spiritual dimension. Tagore understood the 
‘spiritual’ to refer to an open, meditative form of consciousness, a rejection of merely 
instrumental thinking and a sense of the transcendental potential and importance of 
individuals’ unique experiences of existence. As this implies, Tagore was far less 
concerned with the absence of formal religion in the West than with a wider sense of how 
and why human life is valued.  
 
  
Dead Monotony: The Nationalist and Urban West 
 
Tagore maintained a highly suspicious attitude to the process of nation building. ‘In the 
modern world’ he wrote, ‘the fight is going on between the living spirit of the people and 
the methods of nation-organising’ (Tagore, 1922, p143). The West, said Tagore, was 
dominated by the ‘Cult of the Nation’, a cult which destroys human personality and 
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enforces a narrow and selfish relationship between people. This process Tagore described 
as ‘the professionalism [i.e., professionalisation] of the people’ (p146).  
 
For Tagore, the West was a mechanical, officious civilisation, the antithesis of the 
organic culture found within Asia. This distinction mapped onto another: the West was 
essentially urban, and spread itself around the world by way of urbanisation. Authentic 
Asia, by contrast, was to be found, not in any particular nation, but in the countryside. 
‘[D]ead monotony is the sign of the Nation. The modern towns’, Tagore wrote in 
Creative Unity (1922, p144), ‘are everywhere the same, from San Francisco to London, 
from London to Tokyo. They show no faces, but merely masks’. The artifice and 
homogeneity of industrial urbanism was a theme that Tagore returned to on several 
occasions, denouncing, as below in 1924,  the Western relationship between town and 
country that he saw spreading throughout Asia: 
 
unlike a living heart, these cities imprison and kill the blood and create poison 
centres filled with the accumulation of death … The reckless waste of humanity 
which ambition produces, is best seen in the villages. (cited by Hay, 1970, p180) 
 
Tagore cast Asia as a community of tradition that could and should modernise on its own 
terms. This also implied a vision of Asia as united by its status as a victim of Western 
modernisation, as a site of solidarity for those oppressed by inhuman versions of the 
modern. The humiliations of domination thus enabled a kind of resistance, albeit of 
people ‘bowed to the dust’. In Nationalism (1991, p75; first published 1917)  he advises 
‘we of the no nations of the world, whose heads have been bowed to the dust, will know 
that this dust is more sacred than the bricks which build the pride of power’. Thus Tagore 
gives a spiritual value to abasement: to be forced into humility, to be reduced to nothing, 
takes Asia nearer to the sacred and further away from the West. 
 
This line of thinking put Tagore on a collision course with nationalist versions of 
modernity. For many pan-Asianists, Japan’s victory in the Russo-Japanese war (1904-5) 
had ‘awakened from a long night’s sleep this humiliated, disrupted, miserable, and numb 
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Asia’ (Okawa, 1975, p39; first published 1943).  By contrast, Tagore was scornful of the 
way Japan had dramatically ‘proved itself’ by virtue of its military might. In one of the 
angriest passages in Nationalism, he argues that, 
 
the western nations felt no respect for [Japan] till she proved that the bloodhounds 
of Satan are not only bred in the kennels of Europe but can also be domesticated 
in Japan and fed with man’s miseries. They admit Japan’s equality with 
themselves, only when they know that Japan also possesses the key to open the 
floodgate of hell-fire upon the fair earth whenever she chooses. (pp39-40) 
 
 
The West: Not Creative and Not Free 
 
Tagore was not an anti-Westerner. His books swarm with fond images of the English 
romantic poets and he was keenly alert to the utility of science and technology in the 
alleviation of poverty and oppression. Indeed, his reformist, conciliatory approach made 
him vulnerable to accusations of being a Westerniser. Yet, however much Tagore 
protested his faith in a ‘creative unity’  of East and West, his dialectical logic was 
constantly interrupted by the stereotype of the West he had worked so hard to develop. In 
other words, because Tagore’s West was a place of  instrumentalism and soulless anomie, 
it was also a place quite unsuitable for ‘creative unity’. It was a civilisation that did not 
want real contact with others and that was, at root, inherently destructive. Citing the 
British trade in opium in China as an example, Tagore explained that, 
 
The dominant collective idea of the Western countries is not creative. It is ready 
to enslave or kill individuals, to drug a great people with soul-killing poison, 
darkening their whole future with the black mist of stupefaction, and emasculating 
entire races of men to the utmost degree of helplessness. It is wholly wanting in 
spiritual power to balance and harmonise; it lacks the sense of the great 
personality of man. (1991, p99) 
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Thus, Tagore roots the rise of mechanical and instrumental thinking in the West’s hostile 
and destructive culture. The West, he says, is trapped by a vision of the ‘perpetual 
conflict of good and evil, which has no reconciliation’ (1991, p47). 
 
As this portrayal of the West suggests, Tagore, who travelled extensively and for long 
periods in both  Europe and the USA, was cynical about the claims he heard there about 
the value Westerners’ placed on personal freedom. In a open letter from New York, 
published in 1922, he writes that ‘In my recent travels in the West I have felt that out 
there freedom as an idea has become feeble and ineffectual’ (Tagore, 1922, p133). What 
Tagore saw in the West was not freedom but a ‘spirit of repression and coercion’, driven 
by the industrialisation of social relations and the ‘immense power of money’ (p136). 
Tagore was also clear that, as freedom had diminished, the personality and individuality 
of Westerners have become superficial and vulnerable to political manipulation: 
 
Man as a person has his individuality, which is the field where his sprit has its 
freedom to express itself and grow. The professional man carries a rigid crust 
around him which has little variation and hardly any elasticity. This 
professionalism is the region where men specialise their knowledge and organise 
their power, mercilessly elbowing each other in their struggle to come to the front 
(1922, p145) 
 
Tagore associated true freedom and real modernity, with the possibility of individual and 
social creativity, a process that he identified in the Asian relationship to the spiritual. 
Although critical of many areas where freedom and individual development are stymied 
in the East, he cites Buddhism and  the epic poem of Hinduism, the Mahabharata, as an 
illustration of the possibilities of free expression: 
 
[the] great epic of the soul of our people – the Mahabharata – gives us a 
wonderful vision of an overflowing life, full of freedom of enquiry and 
experiment. When the age of the Buddha came, humanity was stirred in our 
country to its uttermost depth. The freedom of mind which it produced expressed 
 25 
itself in a wealth of creation, spreading everywhere in its richness over the 
continent of Asia (1922, p137) 
 
In breaking the association between freedom and Westernisation, Tagore was also 
challenging the link between modernisation and Westernisation. As Sudipta Kaviraj 
(2000, p153) puts it, ‘Tagore defiantly declared that it was the principle of autonomy of 
judgement that constituted modernity, not mere imitation of European practice’. 
‘Modernism is not in the dress of the Europeans; or in the hideous structures, where their 
children are interned to take lessons’ Tagore argued, ‘These are not modern but merely 
European’ (cited by Hay, 1970, p70). ‘True modernism’, he continued,  
 
is freedom of mind, not slavery of taste. It is independence of thought and action, 
not tutelage under European schoolmasters. It is science, but not its wrong 
application in life.  
 
As these sentiments suggest, Tagore did not romanticise poverty or cultural stasis. Yet his 
visionary geographical imagination was attempting to speak to and speak for a vast and 
diverse population. His  attempts to forge a continent and identify its essence were based 
on presumptions about distant societies that Tagore knew less about than he did about 
Victorian Britain. Indeed, although Tagore was self-consciously aware of his own 
powerlessness in the face of the economic and military gains of the West, his project had 
an international intellectual reach and an ambition that parallels that of colonialism itself.   
 
 
 
 
Asian Spirituality: Transcending the West 
 
It has been said many times and for many years that Asia and its associated ideals are 
Western inventions. This paradox was offered, with some justification, as a provocative 
insight by Tagore’s Chinese and Indian critics in the 1920s. Increasingly, though, it has 
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become a cliché; one that explains so much so neatly that it appears to be irresistible. 
There is much to support the contention that, as Hay has it, ‘[p]aradoxically the idea that 
Asia possessed a uniquely spiritual civilisation was essentially a Western idea’ (1970, 
p51). However, the historical detail to support this position can easily slip into a few 
gestual points that act to confirm something many people seem to want to believe: that 
the West created the modern world, that the West is the modern world. In his discussion 
of Okakura, Leo Ching puts the thesis with the kind of assurance and certainty that has 
become characteristic: 
 
The principle of [Asian] identity lies outside itself, in relation to (an)Other. If one 
can ascribe to Asia any vague sense of unity, it is that which is excluded and 
objectified by the West in the service of its historical progress. Asia is, and can be 
one, only under the imperial eye of the West. (Ching, 1998, p70) 
 
The theoretical heritage behind Ching’s depiction is certainly weighty. Deconstruction, 
psychoanalysis, existentialism, and a dichotomising theory of human identity reaching 
from Hegel to Mead, are all put to work on what is, essentially, a political argument. In 
this way philosophical abstractions are given historical resonance, and the non-West 
turned into the archetypal Other. Fanon and Sartre showed us how rhetorically powerful 
this combination of politics and philosophy could be. Yet how accurate is it? The 
political merit of casting the non-West as a shadow land, a landscape of victims, is 
controversial enough. However, I want to argue a more specific and empirical point: that 
the evidence that  Tagore’s ‘Asia’ or his notion of  ‘Asian spirituality’ are either 
essentially or dominantly Western ideas is far from compelling. A corollary of this 
position is that Tagore’s West was not a mere import but produced, employed and 
deployed by Tagore in Asia to articulate an Asianist modernity 
 
This argument does not deny that, like Fukuzawa, Tagore was deeply influenced by the 
West. Tagore was from a very wealthy, Westernised family with a tradition of working 
closely with the British authorities. Moreover, a great number of particular ‘Western 
influences’ can be detected in his work. Some of these are perfect illustrations of the 
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insinuating  and pervasive power of Western orientalism. For example, Tagore was 
greatly influenced by the dissection of ‘the fundamental antagonism between Western 
and Western civilisation’ described in Letters from John Chinaman, written by an 
anonymous Chinese official and published in English in 1901. In his review of the book 
Tagore wrote: ‘I have seen from it that there is a deep and vast unity among the various 
peoples of Asia’ (cited by Hay, 1970, p34). The anonymous ‘Chinese official’ was, in 
fact, G. Lowes Dickinson, a fellow of King’s College, Cambridge, a man who had never 
been to China.   
 
The charge that Tagore’s work is Western has long been asserted by his many Indian 
critics. Tagore’s use of Western forms (such as the novel), Western ideologies (such as 
romanticism) and, most damaging of all, his enormous popularity in the West, have all 
been offered as evidence that damages, fatally, his political and cultural pretensions to be 
either authentically Asian or Indian. The fact that Tagore was awarded the Nobel Prize 
for literature in 1913 and a knighthood in 1915, have been taken to secure his 
inauthenticity. 
 
Bengal has not given Rabindranath to Europe – rather Europe has given him to 
the Bengalis. By praising him, European scholars praise their own gift. I would 
feel more proud if our own poets had received such fame in foreign countries 
(Dinesh Chandra Sen, 1922, cited by Chakrabarty, 2000, p158) 
 
Some recent critics have been more generous. Chakrabarty has  sought to draw out the 
ambivilances within Tagore and position him within a wider project of questioning and 
‘provincialising Europe’. Moreover, Chakrabarty pointedly observes that Tagore’s songs 
and poems remained something of a private vice amongst those on the left who publicly 
condemned him. However, we can also offer a more fundamental defence, one that 
suggests that the evidence that Tagore’s notion of Asian spirituality was a Western 
import only appears conclusive if, a) we delete an even greater weight of material 
suggesting Eastern influence and b),  if we fail to understand that the West was also an 
idea in the process of development. This is not merely a question of positioning Tagore 
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through the language of cultural autonomy; as someone who managed to eke out a little 
non-Western agency. Rather, I take Tagore to be amongst those who actively constituted 
the ideas of Western soullessness and Asian solidarity and spirituality. We have already 
seen how he developed a vision of the West as materialist, as an industrial civilisation 
that ‘professionalises’ and depersonalises its citizens. Yet he also offered a spiritual 
vision of Asia, that far from being a simple replica of the Western ideal of the static, 
timeless East, emphasised its own provisionality and role in creating a collective identity 
in the face of external aggression. 
 
Bharucha (2001, p153) makes the point that, for Tagore, ‘‘Asia’ has not yet been 
completely imagined. If it is ‘one’, it is also multitudinous. Profuse in its possibilities, it 
also remains unknown’. Discussing the work that most clearly shaped Tagore’s vision of 
‘Asia as one’, Okakura’s The Ideals of the East, (2000, first published 1904), Yumiko 
Iida (1997, p417) notes that ‘Okakura presented ‘Asia’ as external to the marks of 
inferiority imposed by the West, as a category beyond the intelligibility of Eurocentric 
discourse’. What these contemporary analysts are suggesting is that Tagore and Okakura 
were not merely taking an image of the soulless West and turning it on its head to make a 
soulful East. Nor can they be seen as re-heating a Western caricature of Asian otherness. 
Their engagement with Eastern religion was creative and synthetic, drawing on Western 
ideas, yet largely dominated by Asian spiritual movements themselves. Moreover, theirs 
was an open-ended project. The privileged point of reference was Buddhism, yet they 
were even more interested in imagining commonalties between Buddhism’s meditative 
practice and doctrine of ‘Infinite Wisdom and Love’ (Tagore, 1922, p72) and Indian folk 
religion (cohered as Hinduism). ‘In both of these religions’, says Tagore, ‘we find man’s 
yearning to attain the infinite worth of his individuality, not through any conventional 
valuation of society, but through his perfect relationship with Truth’ (1922, p76).   
 
Tagore’s occidentalism is more securely placed in a lineage of self-identified ‘Asian’ 
commentary than within Western orientalism. Indeed, a specific Bengali tradition of 
propounding Indian and Asian visions of civilisation and social progress and re-rejecting 
Western modernity and can be identified. For the Bengali religious leader  Swami 
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Vivekananada (1862-1902),  Asia ‘produces giants in spirituality just as the Occident 
produces giants in politics [and] giants in science’ (n.d., p6). It was a conviction that led 
him to spend five years as a Hindu missionary  in Europe and the USA (between 1893-
1896 and 1898-1900). Arriving home as something of a national hero, Vivekananada 
sought to stir his audiences with the thought that Indian thought could conquer the world. 
As he told one audience in Madras: 
 
This is the great ideal before us, and every one must be ready for it – the conquest 
of the whole world by India – nothing less than that … Let foreigners come and 
flood the land with their armies, never mind. Up, India, and conquer the world 
with your spirituality!  … Spirituality must conquer the West. (1966, p100) 
 
Vivekananada’s lectures had such an impact that a number of his converts were prepared 
to follow him back to India. His work, though, is just part of a broader tradition of 
Eastern involvement with, and influence on, the West. Clarke (1997) uses the term 
‘oriental enlightenment’ to explain how Chinese, Indian and Japanese sagacity and 
learning inspired intellectuals in Europe from the sixteenth century. Far from being 
testament to Western creativity, European enthusiasm for the Asian ideal was, in large 
part, a product of both direct and indirect Eastern agency.  
 
Tagore’s willingness to perform the role of venerable Eastern sage before the British and 
American public, should also be examined in a little more detail. The sentimental, 
wooden style of Tagore’s English translations of his poetry accentuated the cliched nature 
of his mysticism. They may, then, be taken to represent an act of self-orientalisation  
before a Western audience. However, in a detailed and persuasive reading of Tagore’s 
‘foreign reincarnation’, Nabaneeta Sen explains how Tagore knowingly and strategically  
allowed himself to ‘[cater] to a rare mystic taste in the Western mind’ (1966, p281). He 
was prepared to translate his poetry into purple prose, even though this would inevitably 
‘contribute to the irreparable loss of his reputation’ (p278) outside India. Sen’s 
assessment is that Tagore ‘deeply believed at that moment, that his responsibilities as the 
“carrier of the Eastern Light” to the unhappy West were greater than his private 
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responsibilities as an artist’ (p281). This, then, was strategic self-orientalisation for a 
practical purpose and for a particular audience. It is a project that suggests that the image 
of ‘Tagore, the Eastern mystic’, far from being product of Western fantasies, was 
designed by Tagore in order to change and shape the West’s view of itself and Asia. 
 
The idea of Asia and the ideal of Asian spirituality can be told as a Western story. It is a 
neat tale and has long found a receptive audience. Yet it is empirically inaccurate and 
confused. Tagore’s vision of Asia was not the flip-side of an established Western notion 
of the West. It constantly strove to transcend the West, driven by the need to establish a 
space of solidarity that is better understood as something mobile and new than as ‘non-
Western’ or ‘anti-Western’.  Moreover, the idea of the West developed by Tagore and his 
Asianist contemporaries and predecessors has had a considerable impact. The notion that 
Western civilisation is secular and, moreover, soulless, alienated and mechanical still 
forms part of the background common sense on the topic.  
 
 
Tagore and Reflexive Modernisation 
 
Tagore’s modernity contrasts sharply both with the hopes of national independence 
fostered by Fukuzawa as well as with the standard portrayal of modernity as an 
expression of industrialism and bureaucracy. However, the inventive capacity of Tagore, 
his willingness to re-align old identities into new patterns of belonging, suggest he was 
embarked on a project that is formally similar to these other modernist enterprises. 
Another parallel can also be drawn, for the logic of modernity is also commonly aligned 
to a self-questioning and critical sensibility. Themes of uncertainty and reflexivity, along 
with the challenge of living in ‘post-traditional’ communities, have become staple topics 
within Western social theory. They are usually employed to describe the state of 
consciousness that accompanies post-Fordist capitalism. Thus Ulrich Beck’s distinction 
between modernisation as the ‘disembedding and second the re-embedding of traditional 
social norms by industrial social norms’ and ‘reflexive modernisation’ as the 
‘disembedding and second the re-embedding of industrial social norms by another 
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modernity’ (Beck, 1994, p2) is designed to capture both a Western historical  process and 
a recent transition.  
 
The challenges of being alienated both from one’s ‘own traditions’ and from hegemonic 
authority have been negotiated by those subject to Westernisation and colonisation for 
centuries. By limiting the possibility of reflexivity and ‘another modernity’ to a post-
industrial landscape, Beck renders the diverse modernities and patterns of critical 
consciousness seen outside the West as an irrelevance (see also Lash, 1999). We can 
make the more specific point here that Asian spirituality, as understood by Tagore, can be 
understood as a form of reflexive modernisation. Since Tagore was opposed to an 
industrial model of society and, since he did wish to defend certain traditional values, it is 
understandable that he does not appear in the kind of historical overview offered by 
Beck. Yet, Tagore considered himself a defender of the modern. What Tagore was 
concerned with is the identification of progress and modernity with the West, the very 
mistake that continues to render provincial so much Western social theory. We have seen 
how Tagore’s idea of the spiritual developed mystical  and meditative Buddhist and non-
doctrinal Hindu traditions, where emphasis is placed on inner reflection and the removal 
of dogmatic conceit. It is an individualistic exploration that has the restless quality of a 
perpetual and dissatisfied seeking for ‘unity’ and ‘reconciliation’. ‘In dogmatic religion’, 
Tagore tells us, ‘all doubts are laid to rest’. Tagore’s own understanding of religion is, he 
says, ‘indefinite and elastic’: it offers ‘no doctrine or injunction’ and ‘never undertakes to 
lead anybody anywhere to any solid conclusion; yet it reveals endless spheres of light, 
because it has no walls round itself ‘ (1922, p16). This language of spiritual self 
discovery found a considerable following and influence in the West, partly because it 
appears to offer transcendental experience without succumbing to the rigid anachronisms 
of conventional Christianity. However, there is little that is ‘alternative’ or hedonistic 
about Tagore’s approach to the spiritual. It represents, rather, a reflexive, self-questioning 
approach to the problem of modernity, an approach that hopes to embrace modernity 
without being over-impressed by the instrumental and materialist logic associated with its 
Western incarnation.  
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Conclusions 
 
The phrase 'Western modernity' is commonly offered as a tautology. Framing this history 
of misinformation and ethnocentrism is the conceit that not only is the West a Western 
invention but so too is every other point on the compass. There are signs today of a 
coming re-alignment of focus, of a growing dissatisfaction with Eurocentric visions of 
the modern. However, this dissatisfaction is not a force that will resolve or otherwise 
settle the controversies of modernity. If anything, it makes it an even more contentious 
arena.   
 
To understand the contemporary debate it is useful to differentiate  proponents of 
alternative, co-eval and multiple modernities. In part, this is a useful starting point 
because through it we can begin to see an even more diverse set of political and geo-
historical questions and stances coming into view. The politics of splitting modernity are 
illustrative of this potential swarm. One could plausibly argue, albeit on carefully selected 
evidence, it is a conservative device. One could also plausibly argue the opposite. 
Certainly the implication, that unites those who wish to pluralise modernity, that undue 
emphasis has been placed on the way ‘the West made the world’, is grist to a number of 
political mills. It will, undoubtedly, be taken by some to imply that ‘the West isn’t to 
blame’; that world problems (like racism and environmental crisis) ‘are not the West’s 
fault’. By contrast, for others it will imply that the critique of Eurocentric history and 
geography needs to go further, that Western arrogance has long presented a myopic 
vision of the world. Although there is something in both of these positions, the former is 
the more tendentious and potentially abusive of scholarship in the area. However, I would 
also question the premise that one can form a coherent political position on the basis of 
being a ‘supporter’ of plural modernities approaches. As the debate on Western 
modernity has already shown us, the a priori politicisation of the modern is inappropriate 
(Bauman, 1991). This point will need to be insisted upon if the pluralisation of modernity 
is not to be traduced into a homogenising tale of ‘global modernity’. This slippage is 
already ubiquitous, acting to rearticulate the liberal multiculturalist conviction that by 
 33 
‘listening to each other’s stories’ we can arrive at a transcendent history of the modern. A 
sophisticated version is heard from Dirlik (2002, p25) who notes that, ‘what distinguishes 
our times from times past is a willingness to listen to invocations of cultural legacies not 
as reactionary responses to modernity, inimical to its achievement, but as the very 
condition of a global modernity’.  
 
What I take from the co-eval approach to modernity is a critical distance from any  
attempts to ‘read back' non-Western modernities from some, supposed, global condition. 
At the same time, it allows us to see these lineages as being produced within a world 
context of dominance, co-option and resistance. By drawing together the discussion of 
modernity with occidentalism, this paper has sought to show how non-Western modernity 
can be seen developing within and beyond distinct regional traditions. However, it has 
also argued that, in the context of Western hegemony,  the two are inextricable: that one 
cannot understand modernity anywhere in the world without looking at how the West 
was developed as an idea and as a force.  
 
The specificity of my empirical material has precluded generalisations about Japanese or 
Indian ideas of the West. Yet, although I have not claimed them as 'voices for their 
nations', it is clear from the preceding analysis that Fukuzawa and Tagore evidence 
creative and complex ways the West has been, not simply assimilated or absorbed, but 
actively created and deployed within specify national debates and struggles. It has also 
become clear that occidentalism has not occurred in isolation from the construction of 
other 'other' ethno-geographical stereotypes. Thus we have seen that the idea of Asia 
and/or the Orient was fundamental to the thinking of Fukuzawa and Tagore, although for 
very different reasons. Neither Fukuzawa’s nationalist modernity nor Tagore’s Asian 
spiritual modernity can adequately be understood as either Western or anti-Western. ‘The 
West’ has not merely or simply been an external referent, something always ‘already 
there’ that defines (but is not defined by) the world. Rather it has been something 
produced from outside of itself. 
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